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Great Britain’s carbon emissions from electricity generation fell by two-thirds between 2012 and 2019, 
providing an important example for other nations. This rapid transition was driven by a complex 
interplay of policies and events: investment in renewable generation, closure of coal power stations, 
raising carbon prices and energy efficiency measures. Previous studies of the impact of these 
simultaneous individual measures miss their interactions with each other and with exogenous changes 
in fuel prices and the weather. Here we use Shapley values, a concept from cooperative game theory, 
to disentangle these and precisely attribute outcomes (CO2 saved, changes to electricity prices and 
fossil fuel consumption) to individual drivers. We find the effectiveness of each driver remained stable 
despite the transformation seen over the 7 years we study. The four main drivers each saved 19–29 
MtCO2 per year in 2019, reinforcing the view that there is no ‘silver bullet’, and a multi-faceted 
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Abstract   
Great Britain’s carbon emissions from electricity generation fell by two-thirds between 2012 
and 2019, providing an important example for other nations.  This rapid transition was driven 
by a complex interplay of policies and events: investment in renewable generation, closure of 
coal power stations, raising carbon prices and energy efficiency measures.  Previous studies 
of the impact of these simultaneous individual measures miss their interactions with each 
other and with exogenous changes in fuel prices and the weather.  Here we use Shapley 
values, a concept from cooperative game theory, to disentangle these and precisely attribute 
outcomes (CO2 saved, changes to electricity prices and fossil fuel consumption) to individual 
drivers.  We find the effectiveness of each driver remained stable despite the transformation 
seen over the 7 years we study.  The four main drivers each saved 19–29 MtCO2 per year in 
2019, reinforcing the view that there is no ‘silver bullet’, and a multi-faceted approach to 
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Summary 
Great Britain’s carbon emissions from electricity generation fell by two-thirds between 2012 and 
2019, providing an important example for other nations.  This rapid transition was driven by a 
complex interplay of policies and events: investment in renewable generation, closure of coal 
power stations, raising carbon prices and energy efficiency measures.  Previous studies of the 
impact of these simultaneous individual measures miss their interactions with each other and 
with exogenous changes in fuel prices and the weather.  Here we use Shapley values, a concept 
from cooperative game theory, to disentangle these and precisely attribute outcomes (CO2 saved, 
changes to electricity prices and fossil fuel consumption) to individual drivers.  We find the 
effectiveness of each driver remained stable despite the transformation seen over the 7 years we 
study.  The four main drivers each saved 19–29 MtCO2 per year in 2019, reinforcing the view that 




Carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation in Great Britain have fallen by 66% 
between 2012 and 2019 – a faster decline than in any other country1 (see Figure 1).  The UK 
government adopted all the standard policy responses to a negative externality: taxes, subsidies 5 
and regulations.  Polluters pay a price for carbon emissions, through the EU Emissions Trading 
System and the UK’s Carbon Price Support.  Substitutes for fossil-fuelled electricity are subsidised 
via several schemes supporting renewable generation and energy efficiency.  Regulations to 
reduce acid rain had the effect of closing 40% of high-carbon power stations (11 GW)2.  The 
relative contribution of these policies towards decarbonisation is unknown as they happened 10 
simultaneously, interacted with one another, and were muddied by exogenous effects such as 
changing fuel prices and the weather. 
In this study, we estimate the emissions reductions that can be attributed to the above changes 
that took place, along with their impact on wholesale electricity prices and consumption of fossil 
fuels.  We calculate Shapley Values from repeated runs of an electricity dispatch simulation with 15 
different combinations of changes activated.  The Shapley Value is a concept from cooperative 
game theory that allocates the benefits created by individual players when they come together in 
a coalition.  We replace “players” by changes to the electricity system, and define “outcomes” as 
changes in carbon emissions, prices and fossil fuel consumption. 
This incorporates all the interactions between drivers, as for example the effect of closing coal 20 
plants added to that of (separately) raising carbon prices will differ from the impact of doing both 
together.  In doing so, our method avoids the under- or over-allocation which can happen with 
current methodologies.  We show the relative importance of the changes we document, over the 
entire period and in each year.  Emissions rose in 2013 when coal became cheaper relative to gas, 
and the steadily rising British carbon price had more impact in reducing emissions than the 25 
fluctuating price of European emissions allowances.  Among renewable generators, the increase 
in onshore wind had the greatest overall impact and solar PV the smallest.  
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Figure 1: Normalised carbon emissions from electricity generation in Great Britain and comparable 
markets.  Total annual emissions (in MtCO2) are indexed to 100 for each country’s value in 1990 to show 30 
the change over the last three decades.  Data sourced from Refs. 3,4. 
1.1 Decarbonising British electricity 
When the British electricity sector was privatised in 1990-1, over 70% of generation was coal-
fired, and much of the rest came from nuclear power.  CO2 emissions fell steadily during the 
1990s as new entrants and incumbents built gas-fired stations.  Renewable capacity expanded 35 
under a succession of policies: the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation held a series of tenders for new 
capacity; the Renewables Obligation offered tradable green certificates; Feed-in Tariffs were 
available for small-scale generators from 2010 until 2019, and large ones have been offered 
Contracts for Differences since 2014.  The EU ETS introduced a carbon price in 2005, and this 
was supplemented by the UK’s Carbon Price Support (a tax) from 2013 onwards.  That was part 40 
of a package of policies that eventually led to a government pledge to phase out coal capacity by 
2025; long before that pledge, the EU’s Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) forced 
generators either to invest in Flue Gas Desulphurisation equipment or to retire their coal- and 
oil-fired plant before the end of 2016, making the choice by the end of 2007. 
Several studies have estimated the impact of wind generation on British carbon emissions by 45 
regressing half-hourly emissions against contemporaneous wind output1,5,6, which has become 
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(including carbon prices) affect the marginal emissions savings from wind.  The impact of relative 
fuel prices is also stressed by Abrell et al.8, who use a machine learning model to estimate the 
impact of the UK Carbon Price Support on emissions.  Using simulation models, Hirth9 and 50 
Mills et al.10 study the drivers of falling prices in two European and seven US markets respectively, 
changing each factor in turn, while holding all others at their start-year values.  There were 
sizeable interaction effects in seven of these nine markets, and in one (the Southern Power Pool 
in the US) they were larger than any of the identified drivers.  The British energy regulator, 
Ofgem, also found interaction effects when assigning emissions reductions to specific policies11, 55 
apparently ignoring the effect of exogenous changes (e.g. in fuel prices).  We model the full range 
of changes and show how the Shapley value treats interaction effects.  
1.2 Attributing emissions reductions 
We calculate the impact of the various changes to British electricity generation between 2012 and 
2019, chosen as the period of greatest change in emissions.  We use the simulation model from 60 
Ward et al.12 to estimate counter-factual emissions in the absence of each change and all 
combinations of them.  The model is an enhancement of the merit order stack approach, which 
finds the electricity generation mix in each half-hour that minimises the variable cost of meeting 
demand given the available generating capacity, profile of renewable generation, fuel and carbon 
prices.  The standard approach ignores much of the complexity and inter-temporal constraints 65 
on operating power systems13, but our enhancement adjusts generator costs to represent some of 
their impacts.  It yields accurate prices and output shares at the monthly-aggregate level (Figure 






Figure 2: Model inputs and outputs, showing ability to replicate historic data.  Panels (a) and (b) 
show the infrastructural and economic inputs to the model, and their evolution at three-month 
resolution over the period we study.  Panels (c) and (d) show the modelled electricity generation from 75 
coal and natural gas when all inputs followed their historical evolution, set against observed outputs17.  
Panels (e) and (f) show the modelled carbon emissions and electricity prices from the same scenario, 
against historical evolution17.  The root-mean-square errors on these outputs at three-month resolution 
were 1.8 and 1.9 TWh for coal and gas generation, 0.99 MtCO2, and £2.40/MWh.  
Speed is important as calculating the Shapley value requires us to estimate the emissions from 80 
every possible combination of our 14 changes to the electricity system, requiring 214 = 16,384 
model runs.  Each change (model input) was either allowed to vary as it had done over the period 
(as shown in Figure 2a and 2b) or was held constant at 2012 levels (e.g. wind capacity remained 
at 6.5 GW).  For each combination of changes being fixed or free, the model estimates the 
dispatch of power stations, and thus the resulting CO2 emissions and power prices in each year 85 
from 2012 to 2019. 
Calculating the Shapley Value14 then allows us to quantify the marginal impact of each change, 
averaged across all possible realisations of the other changes.  The Shapley value has several attractive 
properties, not least that Shapley values add up to the overall change in emissions with no separate 
interaction term, and these interactions are fairly apportioned between the individual changes. 90 
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2 Results 
2.1 Modelling the British electricity system’s evolution 
Figure 3 shows the underlying simulations from which our results derive.  The four panels show 
the monthly electricity generation mix with different variables held constant at 2012 levels. 
Given these simulations, the traditional methodology for assigning carbon emissions to 95 
individual changes in generation, fuel prices or taxes is to calculate emissions in a counter-factual 
scenario with each change in turn, holding all other factors constant.  We do this in Figure 4a, 
showing that this over-estimates the importance of our changes.  The sum of the individual 
changes is 28.5 MtCO2 (26%) greater than the observed reduction in emissions.  Closing coal 
stations in a system with a low emissions price and little renewable capacity is likely  100 
 
 
Figure 3: Electricity generation mix in Britain under different scenarios.  Each panel shows the 
monthly electricity output from each technology we consider.  Different sets of input parameters are 
held constant at 2012 levels across the four panels: (a) none, as in all variables represent their historic 105 
development; (b) the installed capacity of coal power stations, including coal converted to biomass; (c) 
also the installed capacity of renewable generators, wind and solar; and (d) also the carbon prices (both 
ETS and CPF). 
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to have a large impact on emissions.  The same would be true for adding renewable capacity or a 
carbon tax, but the effect of doing these after coal capacity has been removed would be smaller. 110 
Figure 4b shows an alternative approach (also adopted by Ofgem11) in which we calculate the 
effect of “everything but” a given change occurring. This has the opposite problem, resulting in 
a nearly symmetric error of –32 MtCO2 (–29%).  Removing a carbon tax from a system which 
now has few coal plants and many renewable generators has relatively little impact, and so there 
is again a large interaction effect.  For the other metrics we consider, the residuals amount to £6–115 
13 / MWh error on wholesale electricity prices, 50–58 TWh/year output from coal and 48–54 
TWh/year from gas power stations.  
 
 
   120 
Figure 4: Waterfall diagrams showing the individual marginal impact of changes to the British 
power system on carbon emissions.  Substantial residual terms highlight the inability of existing 
methods to accurately attribute emissions savings.  Panel (a) shows individual changes made from the 
2012 starting point, with all variables are fixed at 2012 levels except the one labelled.  Panel (b) shows 
individual changes made from the 2019 end point.  Change in gas capacity is merged with other coal 125 
capacity as it was negligible (<0.2 MtCO2).  Grey bars at the far left and far right show the modelled 
emissions in the start and end years.  Yellow points show the actual observed emissions for comparison.  
Green bars which move downwards indicate reductions due to a change, red bars which move upwards 
indicate increases.  Changes are grouped into broad categories indicated by the bold captions, and the 
combined savings due to each category are highlighted with numbers above the bars.  130 
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Both panels of Figure 4 emphasise the importance of the interaction term for carbon emissions 
(marked as residual in the figure), which must be added to make the effects of individual changes 
sum to the overall total.  
 
2.2 The impact of taxes, subsidies and regulations 135 
Figure 5 shows the influence of the fourteen changes we consider on carbon emissions, electricity 
prices and fossil fuel consumption.  When using Shapley values, these attributed impacts sum 
precisely to the modelled change over the seven years without the need for a residual term.  These 
cumulative changes also correlate well to the historic outturn in each variable, sourced from 
Electric Insights.17 140 
Between 2012 and 2019, annual emissions from electricity generation fell by 109 MtCO2.  Actions 
which reduced the capacity of coal power stations and increased the capacity of renewables had 
the greatest impacts on emissions, saving 57 MtCO2/year between them.  Within this group, 
offshore wind was attributed the largest individual saving of 13 MtCO2, followed closely by 
onshore wind (10), coal conversions to burn biomass (10) and Other coal closures (11 MtCO2).  145 
Higher carbon prices and lower demand saved 39 MtCO2/year, while changes in fuel prices saved 
11 MtCO2.  Falling coal prices in isolation would have raised emissions by 6 MtCO2, but this was 
more than offset by falling natural gas prices saving 17 MtCO2.  Finally, the slightly warmer and 
sunnier weather of 2019 would have saved 2 MtCO2 relative to the 2012 baseline.   We tested an 
alternative methodology of summing the effect of year-by-year changes (as opposed to directly 150 




Figure 5: Waterfall diagrams showing the impact of changes to the British power system on 
outcomes from 2012 to 2019.  These panels show the Shapley Values, where interaction between 155 
changes are accounted for.  Panels (a) through (d) show the impact on carbon emissions, power prices, 
output from coal power stations, and output from gas power stations.  Grey bars at the far left and far 
right show the modelled emissions in the start and end years.  Yellow points show the actual observed 
emissions for comparison.  Green bars which move downwards indicate reductions due to a change, 
red bars which move upwards indicate increases.  Changes are grouped into broad categories indicated 160 
by the bold captions, and the combined savings due to each category are highlighted with numbers 
above the bars. 
Power prices were similar in 2012 and 2019, as the competing influences of the changes offset 
one another.  Reducing capacity increased prices, while increasing capacity and reducing demand 
lowered them, as would be expected from microeconomics.  Raising carbon prices added 165 
£18/MWh (40%) onto wholesale electricity prices, but this was mostly offset by falling prices for 
fossil fuels. 
Closing coal plants led to 48 TWh less generation from coal in 2019, offset by 31 TWh greater 
generation from natural gas and an increase in biomass output (not shown).  The LCPD and 
10 
Other closures were met by almost equal increases in gas output, but biomass conversions 170 
displaced both 11 TWh of coal and 5 TWh of gas.  Increasing the capacity of renewables reduced 
total output from fossil fuels by 47 TWh, displacing a mix of approximately 2/3 gas to 1/3 coal, 
which is similar to the mix of fossil fuels displaced by changes in demand, nuclear output and 
imports.  
Raising carbon prices led to 32 TWh of coal being replaced by 30 TWh of gas, with increased 175 
output from biomass plants making up the difference.  Both fossil fuel prices were lower in 2019 
than in 2012, but the price of gas fell by more than coal.  The net effect was to reduce coal 
generation by 21 TWh and increase gas output by 23 TWh, displacing a small amount of biomass 
output.  Adding these effects together, we get a 53 TWh reduction in coal output relative to 2012 
and a 53 TWh increase for gas. 180 
Cumulative changes arguably matter more than the end-point changes reported in the figures 
above, especially with respect to CO2 emissions.  Figure 6 shows the time evolution of changes 
to carbon emissions attributed to each change, and their cumulative impact.  This was calculated 
by running our model from 2012 to each year from 2013–19.  Over the seven years we consider, 
cumulatively these changes amount to 0.503 GtCO2 saved, or ~7.5 tCO2 per capita. 185 
Retiring fossil fuel capacity had the greatest impact due to its early action relative to other 
changes; it was the only change to have major effects in 2013 and 2014.  Falling electricity demand 
and higher carbon prices were the second and third most influential changes.  The carbon savings 
attributed to many of the changes have accelerated over this period, with the exceptions of solar 
PV, imports and nuclear.  Solar PV levelled off as new installations stalled once government 190 
subsidies were cut significantly in 2016.  Cumulative savings from nuclear and imports declined 




Figure 6: The time evolution of carbon emissions saved due to each change.  Panel (a) shows the 195 
annual emissions from electricity generation, with ‘wedges’ of emissions savings from each change.  
Panel (b) shows the cumulative carbon saved by the changes.  In both panels, emissions saved are 
represented by the calculated Shapley values.  Selected changes were grouped together for the sake of 
visibility (coal and gas capacity as fossil capacity, coal and gas prices as fuel prices, imports and nuclear).  
Full results for the individual changes are given in the Supplementary Information.  200 
 
2.3 The efficacy of specific actions 
For each change, we find the attributed annual carbon savings can be described competently by 
a linear function of the magnitude of the change.  For example, each GW of coal capacity that 
retired is associated with an additional 1.30 ± 0.09 MtCO2/year saved (adjusted R2 = 0.96), and 205 
every £1/tCO2 added to the carbon price is associated with an additional 0.65 ± 0.03 MtCO2/year 
saved (adjusted R2 = 0.99).  Figure 7 shows a selection of these relationships, and full regression 
statistics for all changes are presented in Supplementary Table 1. 
The carbon impact of renewables (Figure 7a) depends upon the technology: for each GW 
installed, solar PV saves 0.51 MtCO2/year, onshore wind saves 1.26, offshore wind saves 2.04, and 210 
biomass saves 4.54.  The difference is driven by their relative productivity, with capacity factors 
over the period of 2012-19 averaging 10% for solar PV, 27% for onshore wind and 38% for 




Figure 7: The correlation between emissions savings and various system parameters over time.  
Points represent the annual emissions savings in each year from 2012 to 2019, connected by pale lines 
to show the evolution.  Panels (a) and (b) show the emissions savings attributed to renewable generation 
technologies, and panel (c) and (d) show the emissions savings attributed to changing carbon and fuel 
prices.  The emissions saved in each year are presented relative to the 2012 baseline, hence the 5 GW 220 
of onshore wind already installed in 2012 is attributed zero savings (in panel a), and coal prices below 
£10 per MWh of fuel yield negative savings, meaning emissions higher than those of 2012 (in panel c).  
Panel (b) compares renewable technologies normalised by their output, and panel (d) compares fuel 
and carbon prices normalised by their impact on electricity generation costs.  The carbon differential 
indicates the additional cost added to electricity generation from coal over and above the cost added 225 
to generation from gas, due to changes in carbon prices. 
carbon) had the greatest impact per GW as utilisation rates were higher than for other 
renewables, and the output from coal capacity that was otherwise closed was largely replaced by 
gas generation (with over three times the carbon intensity of biomass). 
When these impacts are normalised per GWh of electricity generated they reveal similar 230 
magnitudes of carbon saving, indicated by similar slopes in Figure 7b.  Solar PV saved 598 tCO2 
per GWh, onshore and offshore wind saved 556 and 536 tCO2 respectively, and biomass saved 
585 tCO2.  Other actions which changed the level of net demand to be met also had comparable 
effects on emissions.  Each GWh reduction in net demand is attributed 592, 619 and 572 tCO2 
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for demand, imports and nuclear respectively.   Our alternative methodology based on year-by-235 
year changes produces broadly similar results, although with greater variation around the trends.  
We are following the national carbon accounting convention and exclude emissions from 
producing the electricity imported by the UK.  However, using the average emissions factors 
from Supplementary Table 1, the increase in imports compared to 2012 would have caused 1.3 
MtCO2 of emissions in neighbouring countries in 2019.  The average carbon intensity of 240 
imported electricity was 223 tCO2 per GWh, although the marginal intensity might well have 
been higher.  Over the whole period, imports saved 37 MtCO2 of British emissions, but caused 
increases elsewhere of 9.4 MtCO2. 
Increasing fuel prices had opposing impacts, shown in Figure 7c.  Adding £1 per MWh of 
chemical energy in coal lowered emissions by 3.25 MtCO2/year, whereas adding £1 per MWh of 245 
natural gas raised emissions by 2.11 MtCO2/year.  When the fuel costs are translated into the 
impact on electricity generation cost (by dividing by the average power station efficiencies) they 
yield almost equal and opposite slopes.  Emissions rise by 1.17 MtCO2/year or fall by 1.10 
MtCO2/year when increasing the generation cost by £1/MWh for coal and gas respectively.  
Increasing the price of carbon had a near-uniform impact over the range of £7 to £37/tCO2 250 
experienced between 2012 and 2019, reducing emissions by 0.65 MtCO2/year for each £1/tCO2.  
Increasing the carbon price by £1.78/tCO2 would raise the cost of generating electricity from coal 
by £1/MWh more than it raises the cost of electricity from gas16, and according to our model this 
would reduce emissions by 1.15 MtCO2/year.  It should not be a surprise that this number is 
neatly between the estimated impacts of an increase in the cost of coal generation and a decrease 255 
in that of gas.     
3 Discussion 
In this article, we borrow an old concept from game theory to answer a modern question about 
how a range of overlapping complementary and conflicting actions influenced carbon emissions, 
electricity prices and fossil-fuel consumption in Great Britain’s power system.  The use of Shapley 260 
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values requires a well-calibrated model which is rapid enough to run 214 calculations but accounts 
for the interaction between terms, fairly allocating any amplifying or rebound effects they have. 
These estimates are attributional rather than causal.  They account for interactions between the 
direct changes we specify; for example, a diminishing effect when coal plants are retired and 
carbon prices raised (as the carbon price reduces output from fewer stations, or equally the 265 
closures are of plants that would have run less intensively).  They do not account for indirect, or 
secondary, relationships; such as that between price and demand, which we take to be exogenous, 
but would have had time to respond to price changes driven by the changes we study.   Therefore, 
shutting coal plants or raising the carbon price would have caused greater carbon savings than 
stated here due to the secondary effect of reducing consumption; and had a lower impact on 270 
power prices for the same reason.  We do not attempt to divide the trend in demand between the 
effect of energy efficiency policies, changes in overall economic activity in Britain and exogenous 
technical change.  Nonetheless, we believe that our decomposition of the fall in emissions 
provides useful insight into the relative contribution of the different changes we have identified. 
A further step would be to compare those contributions to the cost of implementing each change.  275 
For the renewable technologies, how much investment was required, and what costs were 
avoided as output from coal and gas stations was displaced?  For the carbon prices, how far did 
an increase in the cost of generation (measured at pre-tax prices) offset the benefit of lower 
emissions?  What was the social value of the additional government revenue brought in by the 
taxes?  What deadweight losses were imposed when the cost of subsidies to renewable generators 280 
were passed on?  These questions (suggested by an anonymous referee) are beyond the scope of 
this paper, but signal an important area for future research. 
A key message from our case study of Great Britain is that reducing power sector CO2 emissions 
by two-thirds – a feat which must be rapidly replicated around the world – was the result of a 
broad multi-faceted approach.  Shutting coal power stations, installing renewables, raising the 285 
cost of coal and carbon emissions and improving energy efficiency (to reduce demand) all 
contributed significantly.  None of these could have been forsaken, and all worked together to 
reduce emissions. 
15 
The British power system is undergoing a complex and far-reaching transition: in seven years coal 
was replaced by gas as the dominant dispatchable fuel and renewable energy sources quadrupled 290 
their share of electricity supply.  Despite this shifting background, we find the carbon impact of 
each driver we study has been relatively consistent and can be described as a simple linear 
function of its magnitude.  Any action which made electricity more expensive to generate from 
coal than from gas has a similar impact on emissions, regardless of whether it was driven by 
exogenous movements in international fuel prices and European carbon markets, or specified 295 
changes to national carbon taxes. 
Each TWh of electricity that was generated by low-carbon sources (or not consumed due to 
efficiency and other measures) displaced a similar mix of coal and gas generation and saved a 
similar amount of CO2, in the range of 573±24 gCO2/kWh.  This is regardless of the very different 
temporal patterns of output from nuclear, biomass, wind or solar.  These values could be thought 300 
of as ‘long-term marginal’ abatement factors, which lie centrally in the range of short-term (e.g. 
half-hourly) marginal emissions abatement identified in previous econometric studies.  The long-
term stability we identify could provide a simple yet reasonably effective means for estimating 
the impact of future policy and technology changes.   
Building 1 GW of offshore wind reduced British emissions by 2.01±0.09 MtCO2/year at any point 305 
during this period, despite the rest of the system decarbonising (which could diminish its 
marginal impact).  However, if a system enters a new regime (as may now be happening in Britain 
with the almost complete elimination of coal), then the impact of future changes would be 
different (and perhaps revealed by prospective studies).  
Here we use this technique to understand how policy, investment and economic actions helped 310 
in the past.  This technique could usefully be applied to historic analyses in other countries, or 
more importantly to future ones; for example, assessing the role of different options in IPCC 
scenarios.  This potentially offers a more robust way to estimate the ‘value’ of individual 
technologies or actions to future decarbonisation, accounting for the complex, and potentially 
more numerous interactions they have upon one another.    315 
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4 Experimental procedures 
4.1 Resource availability 
The datasets used in this study are available in the Zenodo repository as Supplementary Data, 
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4294014 (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4294014). This includes the raw 
data for all results presented here and input data for Figs. 1–7. 320 
The half-hourly time series data for demand, supply and prices used in the model and for 
validation are available upon request, subject to licensing conditions.  The R and Excel code used 
to perform the analysis in this paper are available upon reasonable request from the lead contact: 
Iain Staffell, i.staffell@imperial.ac.uk. 
 325 
4.2 Shapley values  
We need to go beyond the standard methodology for assessing policy-driven changes in 
emissions, which is to estimate the change in emissions with and without that policy in place, 
because the British electricity system was affected by so many changes at the same time.  
Renewable generation, considered in isolation, would have displaced a higher-carbon mix of 330 
fossil fuel stations in 2012 (when gas prices were relatively high) than it did in 2019, when coal 
stations had largely been driven off the system by carbon prices.  Similarly, the potential impact 
of carbon prices would appear to be greater in 2012 (when 68% of generation was fossil-fuelled) 
than in 2019, when renewable and nuclear output met 49% of demand. 
Our approach adopts the Shapley value, which is a concept from cooperative game theory, used 335 
to divide the benefits from forming a coalition among the members (players) of that coalition.  
It measures the incremental contribution that each player brings to the coalition, averaged over 
all the possible (ordered) ways in which the coalition could be formed by incrementally adding 
players.  Rewarding people with their marginal contribution is a standard idea in economics, and 
the Shapley value guarantees that this will exactly allocate the benefits available, which is not 340 
necessarily the case when, for example, workers are paid their marginal product.   
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In its traditional setting, the intuition for the Shapley value can be seen as giving each member 
of a coalition the gain they create when they join the coalition, averaged over all the possible 
(ordered) ways in which the coalition could have been formed. In our setting, the Shapley value 
for change i, 𝜑𝑖, is given by: 345 
𝜑𝑖(𝑣) = ∑
|𝑆|! (|𝑁| − |𝑆| − 1)!
|𝑁|!




where N is the set of changes that we consider (listed in Section 4.5), S is any subset of those 
changes that does not contain change i, and v is the relationship between the changes to the 
electricity system and the resulting change in outcomes.  In this paper, v primarily relates to 
carbon emissions (MtCO2 / year) from electricity generation, and we also consider variants where 
v relates to wholesale electricity prices (£/MWh), electricity generated from coal (TWh/year) and 350 
from natural gas (TWh/year).  The second term in the equation shows the impact of adding 
change i to each possible subset of other changes, while the first term is a weighting factor that 
counts all the possible (ordered) ways in which that subset could have been formed and then 
joined by the remaining changes outside the subset. 
Our main results compare the outcomes in each year with those for 2012.  We start with 2012 355 
input values for all prices, capacities and the overall level of demand, but reflect the effects of the 
year’s weather on demand, wind and solar output.  Shapley values are then computed from the 
differences between this weather-adjusted base case and the outcome with each combination of 
changes to our fourteen drivers.   
We computed an alternative set of results based on year-to-year changes, calculating base 360 
scenarios for 2013 with 2012 input values, 2014 with 2013 input values, and so on.  For each 
driver, the overall impact of changes over the whole period equalled the sum of the year-to-year 
changes.  Changes that were concentrated at either end of the period are perhaps over- or under-
weighted; the LCPD closures of coal capacity, for example, came early and thus affected a 
relatively high-carbon system.  The year-by-year approach “locks in” this stronger impact, whereas 365 
our preferred approach credits it (in Figure 6) for those early effects, but also shows that other 
changes were reducing emissions later on in any case. 
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4.3 Model for simulating electricity market outcomes 
We employ a model which simulates power station dispatch, prices and emissions in the British 
electricity market.  This calculates the short-run equilibrium (how operations would change) 370 
rather than the long-run equilibrium (how investment decisions would change) due to the short 
timescales involved and to free us from dependence on contentious and uncertain assumptions 
(such as the time-varying capital costs of different technologies). 
We employ a Merit Order Stack, a simple but widely used approach to modelling electricity 
markets, minimising the variable cost of generation while meeting hour-by-hour demand and 375 
ensuring that no generator produces more than allowed by its available capacity.  Standard merit 
order stack models ignore the interactions between time periods that are driven by start-up costs, 
minimum loading levels and limited ramping rates.  Such interactions mean electricity prices 
can fall dramatically at times of low demand as inflexible generators try to remain on the system 
and avoid the cost of starting again when demand rises, or can rise dramatically at times of peak 380 
demand when a generator must be brought online for a short time, and thus must recover its 
incurred costs from limited energy sales. 
The Enhanced Merit Order Stack we use reflects this by splitting each type of capacity into 
tranches.  We scale down the variable cost of the first tranches to reflect unwillingness to shut 
down, and scale up the variable cost of later tranches to reflect higher mark-ups when capacity 385 
margins are lower.  Coal and gas stations are each given nine capacity tranches, with relative sizes 
and marginal costs estimated using the procedure described in Ward et al. 12. 
The model uses the optimisation:  
min
𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡




𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑗𝑖
= 𝑑𝑡∀𝑡 (3) 
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𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴  ∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡 
(4) 
where C is the variable cost of generation over the entire period, 𝑥𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the output from tranche 
j of capacity type i in sub-period t, 𝑐𝑖,𝑗,𝑡is the per-unit variable cost of output from that tranche 390 
(which may vary between sub-periods), 𝑑𝑡is the demand to be met in sub-period t, and 𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴  is 
the available capacity of tranche j of capacity type i in sub-period t. 
The model operates at the resolution of the British electricity market (half-hourly), and is 
specified plant-wise, meaning that each individual power station is defined by its capacity and 
efficiency.  The model determines the output from fossil-fuelled generators (coal, combined cycle 395 
gas turbines, and oil-fired open cycle peaking plants) and biomass generators, subject to meeting 
demand net of weather-driven renewables, nuclear plants and imports.   These three classes of 
generation are treated as exogenous because their dispatch decisions are beyond the scope of this 
model.  The availability of renewables (wind, solar PV and hydro) is determined by prevailing 
weather conditions, and these have near-zero marginal costs so will be dispatched whenever 400 
possible.  Similarly, the inflexibility and low marginal costs of nuclear reactors means their 
dispatch is governed by availability (i.e. maintenance and unplanned outages).  Trade of 
electricity depends on the interplay between prices in Britain and its neighbouring markets 
(France, Ireland, Netherlands and Belgium).  Simulating these prices with comparable accuracy 
would require more computing power and granular data than are available.  405 
4.4 Input data 
Time-series data for demand and exogenous forms of supply were used with half-hourly 
resolution covering 2012–19.  Historic metered data for each variable were acquired from Electric 
Insights17.  Demand was based on transmission-system demand from National Grid with output 
from ‘embedded’ wind and solar panels added back, as detailed in Ref. (1).  Output data for 410 
nuclear, wind, solar, hydro and trade over each interconnector (France, Netherlands, Ireland and 
Belgium) were based on data from National Grid and Elexon.  Solar PV output was not metered 
in 2012, and so these data were simulated using the Renewables.ninja model18, made available 
via 19. 
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Fuel prices (for coal, natural gas and oil) were defined at quarterly resolution, taken from BEIS 415 
and converted to £/MWh20.  Carbon prices were also specified at quarterly resolution for 
consistency, based on daily EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) prices21, converted from Euros 
to GBP using market exchange rates22, and the Carbon Price Floor (CPF) set by the UK 
government23. 
We modelled each generator unit of a thermal power station in Britain that was over 100 MW, 420 
totalling 57 coal, 65 CCGT (combined cycle gas turbine), 17 oil and OCGT (open cycle gas 
turbine) and 7 biomass.  Each unit was defined by its fuel type, capacity and efficiency, using the 
same data as in Ward et al.12, kindly provided by Bloomberg New Energy Finance24.  The 
evolution of capacity over time was manually sourced from construction and decommissioning 
announcements, and cross-checked against aggregate fleet data from Electric Insights17.  The 425 
carbon intensity of each unit was estimated from the carbon content of its fuel (344 kgCO2/MWh 
for coal, 205 for natural gas and 274 for oil)1, divided by its efficiency.  The fleet-wide average 
efficiency for coal power stations was 36%, and for gas CCGTs it was 52% (against higher heating 
value).  The carbon intensity of biomass units was taken to be 121 kgCO2/MWh of electricity 
based upon upstream emissions from fuel processing and transport1, with legislative 430 
requirements for sustainable forestry management assumed to mean emissions from combustion 
are offset by those from growing feedstock25.  
The data which may legally be disseminated are provided as Supplementary Information. 
4.5 Scenarios considered 
We identify fourteen changes to the electricity industry that accumulated between 2012 and 2019.  435 
A full list of these changes and their values is given in Supplementary Table 2.  They are visualised 
in Figure 2a and 2b. 
It is important to remember that we are considering changes relative to the situation in 2012, 
rather than the absolute impact of (say) all renewable capacity installed by 2019.  Estimating 
absolute impact is an important research question, but it may invalidate the use of other aspects 440 
of the industry’s situation in 2012 as a counterfactual.  The level of fossil-fuelled capacity, for 
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example, changed during the preceding decade, as generators withdrew 5.6 GW of coal capacity 
and added 7.8 GW of CCGT capacity between 2004 and 2012.  Some of these decisions could 
well have been different, had the 7.2 GW of wind capacity present in 2012 not been built. 
We consider four changes to the amount of renewable capacity between 2012 and 2019: onshore 445 
wind, offshore wind, solar PV and large-scale conversions from coal to biomass.  Small-scale 
biomass generators are included within the distributed generation that meets part of the demand 
for electricity without being counted by the transmission system operator.  The biomass 
conversions we include are at Drax, Ironbridge and Tilbury, large coal-fired power stations built 
by the CEGB.  These additions to biomass capacity are matched by reductions in the capacity of 450 
coal-fired power stations. 
We divide the other reductions in coal capacity in two.  6 GW of capacity was opted-out of the 
EU’s Large Combustion Plant Directive, which meant that it could operate beyond 2007 without 
installing flue gas desulphurisation equipment, but was limited to a total of 20,000 hours of 
operation from 2008 onwards, closing by the end of 2015 at the latest2.  While the broad policy 455 
aim of decarbonisation was clear in the mid-2000s, setting the context for decisions on whether 
to invest in these stations or close them, at least two generators had announced plans to build 
new coal-fired stations26, and we believe that it is valid to treat these closures as the result of policy 
to reduce sulphur rather than carbon emissions.  A further 10 GW of capacity was opted-in to the 
LCPD but closed between 2012 and 2019; we treat these later closures as a separate category.  460 
Another EU policy, the Industrial Emissions Directive, was forcing generators to invest in order 
to reduce nitrogen emissions; the rising carbon prices were reducing coal’s share of fossil-fuelled 
generation, and growing renewable output was eating into the overall amount of that generation.  
These pressures are likely to make the later coal closures an endogenous result of the other 
changes we document, but we do not attempt to assign the effect of lower coal capacity on CO2 465 
emissions between these underlying changes.  We also account for the effect of the 1 GW of gas 
capacity added to the system, and 2.6 GW that was retired between 2012 and 2019.  
As already stated, changes to nuclear output were exogenous, determined by maintenance and 
outages rather than economic considerations, as it was in the generator’s interest to produce as 
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much output as possible from these relatively inflexible stations with low variable costs, subject 470 
to safety constraints.  We combine these changes with those to the level of output from hydro 
stations, which depended exogenously on the available water.  Nuclear and hydro made up 21% 
and 1.2% of supply respectively over the period we study.  The level of imports and exports was 
more endogenous, as changing price patterns (particularly higher prices driven by the UK’s 
carbon tax) changed the incentives for trade.  However, in half-hours with large inter-market 475 
price differences (possible when interconnectors are at full capacity), prices in the UK could have 
changed without affecting trade.  Our data show that both the Netherlands and France 
interconnectors operated at full capacity more than half of the time.17  New interconnectors with 
Ireland (500 MW) and Belgium (1,000 MW) were commissioned in 2012 and 2019 respectively.  
We follow the national accounting approach to carbon emissions, ignoring emissions outside 480 
Britain in our model runs, although we do comment on the embodied carbon contained in 
imports when discussing our results.  The discussion is based on the annual average carbon 
intensity of electricity from each country, calculated using the methods from Ref. 1 and listed in 
Supplementary Table 3.  
Electricity demand fell by 10% between 2012 and 2019.  Again, this was a mix of endogenous 485 
and exogenous changes: the normal trend improvement in energy efficiency over time was 
supplemented by the effects of a range of policies; subdued GDP growth (particularly in 
manufacturing) fed through to demand; carbon taxes raised the price of electricity.  The effect of 
renewables on retail prices is potentially ambiguous: their expansion often depresses wholesale 
prices (at least until capacity has adjusted) but subsidy costs can outweigh this. 490 
We treat the carbon price in the EU ETS separately from the UK’s Carbon Price Support.  Again, 
we are looking at the effect of changes in the ETS price relative to its (low) level in 2012, rather 
than its absolute level.  Our final change is the impact of fuel prices, looking at gas and coal 
together.  The UK is integrated into the wider European market for these fuels, and so we think 
of these changes as largely endogenous to UK policies. 495 
The level of fuel and carbon prices, and of fossil-fuelled capacity, are simply fed into our model 
with either the level from 2012 or from the current year.  The remaining variables for demand 
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and other types of generation depend upon the weather, which changes from year to year.  We 
use the Renewables.ninja to calculate the hourly output that 2012 wind and solar PV capacities 
would have produced in each succeeding year based on the prevailing weather.  For demand, we 500 
took the half-hourly profile of electricity demand for each year (which embodied that year’s 
weather patterns) and rescaled their annual total to the annual total of 2012.  This rescaling used 
the weather-corrected demands, so that the actual demand could still vary between years when 
fixed at 2012 levels (to embody whether particular years had cold or mild winters).  Weather 
correction was based on the number of heating degree days in each year, calculated using 505 
temperature data from Renewables.ninja19 assuming a base temperature of 15.5°C, and the 
empirical relationship that British electricity demand rises by 0.82 GW for each degree that 
temperature falls below 15.5°C, meaning each heating degree day corresponds to 19.6 GWh 
additional consumption.  When we simulate the historic capacities and demand levels, we 
naturally use the actual half-hourly data.  This means that our simulations and calculations of 510 
emissions reductions are carried out relative to a fluctuating baseline that reflects the actual 
weather seen each year. 
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9 Supplementary information 
Supplementary Table 1: Regression coefficients for the carbon impact of each change we consider. 
Unit of change 
Emissions 
(MtCO2/year) Standard error Significance Adjusted R2 
Reduce coal capacity by 1 GW –1.615 0.066 *** 0.988 
(specifically LCPD opt-out) –1.598 0.210 *** 0.890 
(specifically other plants) –1.794 0.057 *** 0.993 
Convert 1 GW of coal to biomass –4.753 0.155 *** 0.993 
Reduce installed gas capacity by 1 GW +0.538 0.084 *** 0.851 
Increase offshore wind capacity by 1 GW –2.041 0.085 *** 0.988 
Increase onshore wind capacity by 1 GW –1.259 0.047 *** 0.991 
Increase solar PV capacity by 1 GW –0.508 0.026 *** 0.982 
Increase carbon price by £1/tCO2 –0.646 0.030 *** 0.985 
(specifically ETS prices) –0.643 0.012 *** 0.998 
(specifically CPF prices) –0.685 0.038 *** 0.979 
Increase coal price by £1/MWhfuel –4.062 0.192 *** 0.985 
Increase gas price by £1/MWhfuel +2.633 0.120 *** 0.986 
Reduce electricity demand by 1 TWh –0.592 0.029 *** 0.984 
Increase electricity imports by 1 TWh –0.591 0.020 *** 0.992 
Reduce nuclear output by 1 TWh –0.572 0.009 *** 0.998 
Increase offshore wind output by 1 TWh –0.536 0.016 *** 0.993 
Increase onshore wind output by 1 TWh –0.556 0.023 *** 0.988 







Supplementary Table 2: The fourteen changes to the British power system that we examine. 
 Metric Value in 2012 Value in 2019 Relative change 
Coal capacity (Opted-out of LCPD) GW 6.1 0.0 –100% 
Coal capacity (converted to 
biomass) 
GW 2.4 0.0 –100% 
Coal capacity (other) GW 18.4 8.5 –54% 
Natural gas capacity GW 29.7 28.1 –5% 
Biomass capacity GW 0.0 2.4 ~ 
Offshore wind GW 2.0 9.1 4.5x 
Onshore wind GW 4.5 13.0 2.9x 
Solar PV GW 1.2 13.0 11x 
Carbon price (ETS) £ / tCO2 £6.61 £19.39 2.9x 
Carbon price (CPF) £ / tCO2 £0.00 £18.00 ~ 
Coal price £ / MWhfuel £9.90 £6.99 –29% 
Gas price £ / MWhfuel £21.22 £15.30 –28% 
Electricity demand TWh 319 286 –10% 
Imported electricity TWh 9 21 2.4x 




Supplementary Table 3: Carbon intensity of electricity generated in countries which trade with 
Great Britain (kgCO2/MWh).  Annual average values are presented for each country across all years, 
but only years in which the relevant interconnector was operational were used.  Ireland includes both 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, as these share a single electricity market. 605 
Year France Ireland Netherlands Belgium 
2012 60 487 482 244 
2013 57 460 486 219 
2014 39 449 517 234 
2015 44 437 535 257 
2016 47 433 507 193 
2017 57 392 476 192 
2018 49 356 501 223 
2019 45 310 439 183 
 
  
